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INVESTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS
For a Stronger Organization Worldwide

Report of the Secretary-General

VII. The way forward: investing in change

A. Overall resource requirements

86. Processes of change such as those outlined in the present report, involving farreaching reform of a large organization, can be successfully implemented only by deploying substantial resources. As I noted at the beginning of the present report, the United Nations has suffered from underinvestment. The bill for that is now inevitably due. The precise cost of all these reforms will obviously depend on the details still to be worked out. Nevertheless, I have itemized several major and vital cost increases:

(a) Improving field benefits and conditions to create a single global staff.

(b) Increasing investments in training, recruitment and human resource development.

(c) Strengthening key functions, such as procurement and overall management.

(d) Introducing a new information technology platform.

(e) Approving a staff buyout programme.

87. The sums required may seem large, but:

(a) They would, over time, pay for themselves through the substantial savings in running costs that the reforms will bring;

(b) They will be offset by very large savings in procurement reform, relocation of work and administration simplification;

(c) When combined with the current General Assembly exercise of mandate review, they offer the prospect of a much more focused, professional Secretariat that can deliver on the tasks Member States set it;

(d) Without these comprehensive reforms, we would almost certainly end up spending considerable sums on further piecemeal efforts that would not address fundamental issues;

(e) Most importantly, these reforms will give us a much more productive Organization, with much more highly motivated staff. In fact, this would be a very modest investment compared to the cost of not reforming the United Nations. The return on investment, in terms of the benefit that all Member States and their peoples can expect from a truly effective United Nations, attuned to the needs of the twenty-first century, will be of immeasurable importance to the world.

B. Early and visible change

88. Experience within the United Nations system and elsewhere tells us that reform or change initiatives often fall apart or are not sustained over time unless there is strong leadership from the top, supported by a group of managers and responsible officials assigned full-time to making change happen. It would therefore be naive to expect the comprehensive transformation described in the present report to happen by itself. The Secretariat and Member States, working closely together, will have to refine the blueprint and convert it into detailed proposals, with a disciplined implementation strategy - which must itself be the product of consultation, both among Member States and with the staff at all levels. For the change I propose, which is above all a change of culture, cannot be achieved overnight. It is urgent, and I am determined to implement as much of it as I can in the nine months left to me as Secretary-General. But it needs to continue steadily over a period of years. And this will not happen without an appropriate structure to manage it and drive it forward.

1. Change management office

89. Managing change of this magnitude is not a part-time responsibility. It will be necessary to set up a dedicated capacity within the Secretariat - a change management office, with clear terms of reference and a time limit - which I propose should work closely with a small but representative group of Member States to provide support and guidance.

90. This office, which would report to the Deputy Secretary-General, would work with heads of department and other key leaders within the Secretariat to plan and coordinate the implementation of the reforms. It would monitor performance and hold heads of department accountable for their delivery. It would establish task forces to identify and resolve specific challenges and would supervise their work. It should be led by a highly respected, senior-level manager with deep organizational knowledge and a full understanding of the context as well as the content of the reform agenda, who would be respected by, and have access to, the key decision makers in the Secretariat.

2. A staff buyout

91. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, Heads of State and Government called on the Secretary-General to submit "a detailed proposal on the framework for a onetime staff buyout to improve personnel structure and quality, including an indication of costs involved and mechanisms to ensure that it achieves its intended purpose" (see General Assembly resolution 60/1, para. 163 (c)). I expect to place such a proposal before the General Assembly soon. It will be an essential tool for implementing the reforms proposed in the present report and the conclusions of the review of mandates on which the Assembly is about to embark. Full consultation with staff representatives will be required before my proposals are finalized and they will be based on four principles:

(a) The Secretary-General must be able to realign the staff in accordance with the Organization's priorities. The staff to whom the targeted buyout is offered must therefore be selected on the basis of an analysis of the skills needed in the light of both the management reforms - including business process simplification, changing skills needs, relocation of work and outsourcing - and the mandate review. The decisions that Member States may wish to make on my proposals in this area will also determine the scale of the programme;

(b) The Organization's interests must be protected by ensuring that the buyout does not result in the loss of staff whose skills, experience or knowledge are aligned with operational needs;

(c) The anticipated attrition of staff, particularly at the senior levels through retirement, may affect the scale of the proposed buyout;

(d) The mechanisms for implementing the buyout must be transparent and equitable, with safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions and preserve the Organization's strategic goals.

92. My proposal will offer options for the buyout; the precise cost will depend on which option Member States prefer. A buyout cost of approximately $100,000 per staff member would be anticipated. Therefore, a buyout of 500 staff would cost approximately $50 million; a buyout of 1,000 staff would cost approximately $100 million. I believe this is fully justified as an investment in the United Nations of the future, which must be staffed by people whose skills and aptitudes respond to its priorities.

Proposals

Proposal 22

I therefore propose that dedicated resources be appropriated in order to ensure complete implementation of the detailed proposals resulting from this process. In particular, resources will be needed at an early stage for a change management office and a staff buyout.

Proposal 23

I urge Member States to lose no time in providing dedicated resources for the change management office and setting up an appropriate intergovernmental mechanism to work with it. Such prompt decisions would make it clear, to both our staff and the outside world, that the overall programme of reform is serious and credible.


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